The Battle of Lowestoft
13th June 1665 (3rd June 1665 OS)
Description of the action (taken from Clowes Vol II)
At mid-day on June 1st, it was reported to the Duke of York in Southwold Bay that the enemy was about six miles to the E.S.E.; whereupon the commander-in-chief weighed and put to sea. There is much contradictory evidence as to the direction of the wind at the time. It is probable, however, that it was favourable to the Dutch, and that Obdam's only reason for not attacking at once was that his ships were scattered, and that he desired to enable the whole of his force to come up. He consequently kept away to seaward during the afternoon and night. On the morning of June 2nd, he was visible about five miles to the S.E., and at 8 A.M. Lowestoft was eight miles to the N.W., and the enemy had closed to a distance of three miles or less. But that day there was no farther approach until towards evening. The wind then shifted from E. to S., later veering to S.W. by W with the result that, at about 2.30 A.M. on June 3rd, the fleets were some fourteen miles N.N.E. of Lowestoft, and the English had the weather-gauge.
Prince Rupert led the van, the Duke the centre, and Sandwich the rear. At 3.30 A.M. the action began, and it would appear that the two fleets, each in line ahead, passed one another on opposite tacks in the set manner of the time, though some accounts declare that they passed through one another. Having passed, each turned sixteen points and renewed the encounter. The Dutch seem to have altered course in succession, their van remaining their van, their centre their centre, and their rear their rear; but the English altered course simultaneously, so that, at the second passage, their rear became their van. The Dutch in vain strove to gain the weather-gauge; and it was probably owing to these efforts that at about 1 P.M., in the course of the second or a subsequent passage, Sandwich's squadron found itself mixed up with the Dutch centre, and, either by accident or by design, broke through it, so cutting the enemy's fleet into two parts. It is likely that it was by accident, for the English accounts admit that by that time, owing to the smoke, there was great confusion, and that friendly vessels narrowly escaped firing into one another. Indeed, there is no doubt that, after a certain time had elapsed, order on both sides almost ceased to exist, and the action degenerated into a gigantic melee.
In the course of the struggle, Obdam, in the Eendracht, 76, [This was her nominal force, though English writers call her an 80 and even
an 84. Her real force was only three 36-pounders, twenty-two 24-pounders, fourteen 18-pounders, twelve 12-pounders, and twenty-two 6-pounders: total, seventy-three guns. List in Rijks Archief.] found himself close to the Duke of York in the Royal Charles, 80; and the two commanders-in-chief promptly and hotly engaged one another. The Eendracht attempted to board the Royal Charles, but without success. She nevertheless plied her broadside so well and continuously that the Duke was in the greatest danger of being sunk or of having to surrender. Charles Berkeley, first Earl of Falmouth, Mr. Boyle, second son of the Earl of Burlington, and Lord Muskerry, with others, were killed at the Duke's side by a single chain-shot, and his Royal Highness was covered with their blood, and even, according to one account, slightly wounded in the hand by a splinter from Mr. Boyle's skull. But, at the height of the fight, the Eendracht suddenly blew up, only five souls out of four hundred and nine who had gone into action in her escaping with their lives. It is probable that the accident was occasioned by the ignition of some loose cartridges and the extension of the flames to the powder-room, but popular tradition in Holland ascribes the catastrophe to another cause, and declares that a negro servant of Obdam fired the magazine from motives of revenge.
The explosion, and the loss of their commander-in-chief, increased the confusion of the Dutch, many of whom began to give way and to put before the wind. Yet some of the squadrons, and numerous individual ships, still gallantly held their ground. Jan Evertsen assumed the chief command, but the news of his having done so did not reach Cornelis Tromp, who, knowing of the death of Obdam, and presently learning also that Cortenaer a had succumbed to a wound in the thigh, and that Stellingwerf had been killed by a ball through the body, imagined himself to be the senior surviving officer, and took command of so much of the fleet as remained near him. As late as two days afterwards Tromp wrote to the States-General that he did not know what had become of Evertsen. There can surely be no better proof of the disorganisation of the Dutch.
Yet, with certain disgraceful exceptions, Nagelboom and Hilversum were shamefully surrendered. The Carolus Quintus was betrayed by her mutinous crew. In consequence of misbehaviour, three captains were subsequently sentenced to be shot; three were publicly degraded; two more were dismissed the service; and the master of Cortenaer's ship was made to stand on a scaffold with a halter round his neck, and was afterwards banished. Captain Laurens Heemskerk, of the Vrede, who was condemned in contumacy, later indicated the sentence of his judges by assisting Sir Robert Holmes in August, 1666, and by serving against his country on board the French flagship at Solebay in 1672.] they fought magnificently. Captain Bastiaen Gen ten, in the East India Company's ship Oranje, 76, pressed the Montagu, 52, very hard, and, according to Dutch reports, even had possession of her for a time, until she was retaken by the Royal James, which lost her captain, Earl of Marlborough, and Charles Weston, third Earl of Portland, a volunteer on board, during the fight. The gallant Oranje subsequently caught fire, and her brave commander, who was saved from her ere she blew up, ultimately died of his wounds. Captain Jan den Haen, in the Stad en Lande, 56, actually took the Charity, 46, and eventually carried her into port as a prize. It is but fair to say, however, that the Charity had first been sadly mauled in succession by the Liefde, 70, Elf Steden, 54, and Cruijningen, 58, and that, before she was boarded, about ninety of her people escaped from her and later reached the shore.
But the day was lost; and such minor incidents as the blowing up of the poop of the Saint George, or the fatal wounding of Vice-Admiral Sir John Lawson, who had been detached after some Dutch ships which were making off, failed to revive the spirits of the enemy, even for a moment. By 7 o'clock, P.M., the Dutch were in full flight. Jan Evertsen, and the vessels with him, made for the mouth of the Maas. Tromp and his ships, in somewhat better order, made for the Texel. It was when each man, conscious of defeat, was thinking mainly of himself, that two serious disasters occurred. On one part of the scene of action, the Maarseveen, 78, Ter Goes, 30, and Swanenburg, all belonging to different squadrons. ran on board one another, and were set on fire, and destroyed. On another part, four ships, the Prins Maurits, 53, Coeverden, 56. Utrecht, 48, and one more, 'similarly fouled one another, and being caught, while still interlocked and unmanageable, by an English fireship, were all burnt.
According to Sir William Coventry's report to the Lord High Admiral, the prizes taken and already brought into British ports,
were as follows:
SHIPS. Guns. Men.
Carolus Quintus 54 230
Hilversum 60 290
Delft 32 130
Yacht, De Ruijter 18 80
Jonge Prins 36 160
Mars 50 200
Nagelboom 54 225
Wappen van Zeeland 44 180
Bul 36 150
But to these should be added the Huis te Swieten, 70 guns, 300 men, the Geldersche Ruiter, 48 guns, 180 men, the Westfriesland, 50 guns, 260 men, and probably one more, making fourteen in all, besides four which were abandoned after capture, in consequence of their unseaworthy condition. About fourteen in addition seem to have been destroyed. If this estimate be correct, the total loss of the Dutch was about thirty-two sail. Their loss in officers and men was about 4000 killed and 2000 taken.
The English loss was, in comparison, very slight. That the Charity was taken is admitted by all. The Dutch claim to have also taken the John and Mary, but nothing else. Of killed, there were only about 250, of wounded, about 340; and the Dutch cannot have carried off more than about a couple of hundred prisoners at most. But the victory cost the lives of two English flag-officers and three captains, Vice-Admiral Sir John Lawson, Rear-Admiral Robert Sansom, Captain James Ley, Earl of Marlborough, of the Royal James, Captain Robert Kirby, of the Bredah, and Captain James Abelson, of the Guinea.
But for the pertinacity of Tromp, who covered the retreat, the Dutch would have suffered still more severely. Two other causes contributed to save them from utter destruction. One was that, after the action, it blew hard towards the dangerous Dutch coasts, and that the victors, according to Colliber, had expended all their fireships. The other was the failure of the English to press the pursuit.
Notes:
- Bold indicates a captain killed, or a ship sunk or captured
- (A) Amsterdam Admiralty.
- (F) Friesland Admiralty.
- (R) Maas Admiralty (Rotterdam).
- (NK)Noorderkwartier Admiralty.
- (Z) Zeeland Admiralty.
The Dutch squadrons used the following identifying flags:
(1st) flag at the main
(2nd) flag at the fore
(3rd) flag at the mizzen
(4th) yellow pennant
(5th) red pennant with white stripe
(6th) white pennant with red stripe
(7th) Blue pennant with yellow stripe
Sources:
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